The Ciena Insights Podcast

1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:03,529 Hello, everybody, and welcome to the Ciena Insights Podcast. 2 00:00:03,529 --> 00:00:05,235 Today, in this episode, we'll 3 00:00:05,235 --> 00:00:08,235 be talking about building cyber resilience in an AI 4 00:00:08,235 --> 00:00:11,117 -driven threat landscape. My name's Ashley Wyand. 5 00:00:11,117 --> 00:00:13,941 I am the Director of Security, Governance, Risk, 6 00:00:13,941 --> 00:00:16,588 Compliance, and Customer Trust here at Ciena. 7 00:00:16,588 --> 00:00:19,353 Joining me today are Ryan Hammer and Chad Hunt, 8 00:00:19,353 --> 00:00:22,353 who I'll let give themselves an introduction. Ryan, 9 00:00:22,353 --> 00:00:24,824 you want to go first? Hello, everyone. I'm 10 00:00:24,824 --> 00:00:27,353 Ryan Hammer. I am Ciena's Chief Information 11 00:00:27,353 --> 00:00:29,235 Security Officer. Hello, and I'm 12 00:00:29,235 --> 00:00:31,411 Chad Hunt. I'm the Senior Director of 13 00:00:31,411 --> 00:00:34,176 Security Operations. Great. And in this episode 14 00:00:34,176 --> 00:00:36,941 today, we're going to be unpacking what today's 15 00:00:36,941 --> 00:00:39,470 threat landscape means for business leaders 16 00:00:39,470 --> 00:00:42,529 and customers, how AI is changing attack landscapes, 17 00:00:42,529 --> 00:00:45,235 defense strategies, and why resilient security 18 00:00:45,235 --> 00:00:47,823 operations are critical to maintaining trust 19 00:00:47,823 --> 00:00:50,411 and continuity within your businesses. So if 20 00:00:50,411 --> 00:00:53,176 you guys are ready, I'm going to dive right in. 21 00:00:53,176 --> 00:00:55,705 As we talk about the evolving cybersecurity 22 00:00:55,705 --> 00:00:58,764 threat landscape, and when you look at the landscape 23 00:00:58,764 --> 00:01:01,588 today, what feels most different today from even 24 00:01:01,588 --> 00:01:03,823 just a few years ago? Ryan, maybe I'll 25 00:01:03,823 --> 00:01:05,823 start with you and then we can get 26 00:01:05,823 --> 00:01:08,294 Chad's thoughts. Yeah. So obviously, AI is 27 00:01:08,294 --> 00:01:11,059 really accelerating a lot of threats and really 28 00:01:11,059 --> 00:01:14,294 changing the risk picture for us as it is for everyone. 29 00:01:14,294 --> 00:01:17,176 We really are focused on ensuring that we're very 30 00:01:17,176 --> 00:01:20,411 aggressively addressing our attack surface. And I think 31 00:01:20,411 --> 00:01:23,235 that in many ways, it's kind of changing what we 32 00:01:23,235 --> 00:01:26,000 refer to as the security poverty line. A lot of 33 00:01:26,000 --> 00:01:29,059 these AI exacerbated and accelerated capabilities is 34 00:01:29,059 --> 00:01:32,118 really presenting companies and organizations with a 35 00:01:32,118 --> 00:01:35,412 really kind of evolving risk position. And I think we're 36 00:01:35,412 --> 00:01:38,294 all trying to keep up. And I think that's a great 37 00:01:38,294 --> 00:01:41,235 point, Ryan. And just to riff off of what you were 38 00:01:41,235 --> 00:01:44,235 saying there, keeping up, I think one of the things 39 00:01:44,235 --> 00:01:47,353 that's changed most is speed. Fundamentally, what the 40 00:01:47,353 --> 00:01:50,412 bad actors are trying to do to us has not changed. I 41 00:01:50,412 --> 00:01:53,353 don't think it's changed throughout the history of 42 00:01:53,353 --> 00:01:56,177 time that we can get into a little bit more. But 43 00:01:56,177 --> 00:01:59,177 I think right now, the thing that we're facing more 44 00:01:59,177 --> 00:02:02,059 than anything else is the speed of change and the 45 00:02:02,059 --> 00:02:04,824 speed of trying to address the threats and stay 46 00:02:04,824 --> 00:02:07,765 ahead of the threats and predict the threats. So I 47 00:02:07,765 --> 00:02:10,706 would say speed is what's changed most in the last 48 00:02:10,706 --> 00:02:13,882 few years. Yeah, for sure. You guys hit on it a little 49 00:02:13,882 --> 00:02:16,764 bit, talking about AI as being one of the trends, 50 00:02:16,764 --> 00:02:19,705 but outside of that, are there any other trends or 51 00:02:19,705 --> 00:02:22,646 things that folks should be paying close attention 52 00:02:22,646 --> 00:02:24,999 to or looking out for? Speed, of course, 53 00:02:24,999 --> 00:02:27,352 you mentioned. One of the things I would 54 00:02:27,352 --> 00:02:30,293 say is that I don't think that much has changed in 55 00:02:30,293 --> 00:02:33,411 the last 3,000 years. People are trying to break into 56 00:02:33,411 --> 00:02:36,293 things in the similar fashion that they've always 57 00:02:36,293 --> 00:02:39,175 done. The tradecraft has remained consistent. The 58 00:02:39,175 --> 00:02:42,175 tools and techniques have changed a little bit, but 59 00:02:42,175 --> 00:02:44,704 the insider threat has always been a thing, 60 00:02:44,704 --> 00:02:47,822 protecting whatever the crown jewels are. Back in the 61 00:02:47,822 --> 00:02:50,998 day, it was protecting food stores in a cave. Now it's 62 00:02:50,998 --> 00:02:53,998 protecting intellectual property on a server. Those 63 00:02:53,998 --> 00:02:56,880 fundamental things have not changed over time. So 64 00:02:56,880 --> 00:02:59,998 I think focusing on the fundamentals is the key theme 65 00:02:59,998 --> 00:03:02,704 for going forward. Great. So Chad, we talked a 66 00:03:02,704 --> 00:03:05,528 little bit about AI and Ryan obviously mentioned 67 00:03:05,528 --> 00:03:08,234 that it's part of every security conversation. 68 00:03:08,234 --> 00:03:10,410 Obviously, it is increasing the speed 69 00:03:10,410 --> 00:03:13,116 that you talked about. How else is it changing 70 00:03:13,116 --> 00:03:16,116 maybe the landscape or ways that security teams are 71 00:03:16,116 --> 00:03:19,528 defending their organizations or evaluating their security 72 00:03:19,528 --> 00:03:22,116 postures? Obviously, the speed of attacks is 73 00:03:22,116 --> 00:03:24,998 increasing, but are there other things that AI is 74 00:03:24,998 --> 00:03:27,880 doing or causing in the way we think about either 75 00:03:27,880 --> 00:03:30,880 here at Ciena or any other folks thinking about how 76 00:03:30,880 --> 00:03:34,115 they protect their systems? I think for sure it is. But 77 00:03:34,115 --> 00:03:37,174 again, my theme, I think, is going to be that it's a 78 00:03:37,174 --> 00:03:40,115 continuum, that change is a constant when it comes 79 00:03:40,115 --> 00:03:43,409 to cybersecurity. Some of the things that AI is enabling 80 00:03:43,409 --> 00:03:46,115 is the ability to look at chaining things that 81 00:03:46,115 --> 00:03:49,409 seem trivial in the past, chaining those things together 82 00:03:49,409 --> 00:03:52,527 to be able to find a path that in the past might take 83 00:03:52,527 --> 00:03:55,527 a human days or weeks to discover and may have been 84 00:03:55,527 --> 00:03:58,527 discounted because it was really hard to chain some 85 00:03:58,527 --> 00:04:01,351 of these vulnerabilities together. AI offers the 86 00:04:01,351 --> 00:04:04,586 benefit of never having to sleep. We as humans, we have 87 00:04:04,586 --> 00:04:07,821 biological things that we have to take care of. That is 88 00:04:07,821 --> 00:04:10,939 one way that it is changing and we're having to adapt 89 00:04:10,939 --> 00:04:13,645 to it is from a defender's point of view, it's 90 00:04:13,645 --> 00:04:16,704 important for us to be aware of the attack paths, to 91 00:04:16,704 --> 00:04:19,822 be aware of what the crown jewels are, to be aware of 92 00:04:19,822 --> 00:04:22,881 our own environment. And I think that's an advantage 93 00:04:22,881 --> 00:04:26,352 we have as defenders is that we should know our environment 94 00:04:26,352 --> 00:04:29,234 better than the adversary. There's that old adage 95 00:04:29,234 --> 00:04:32,116 that the adversary only has to get lucky once and 96 00:04:32,116 --> 00:04:35,234 the defender has to be right all of the time. I think 97 00:04:35,234 --> 00:04:38,410 that plays both ways, really, is that the attacker has 98 00:04:38,410 --> 00:04:41,410 to find the way through the defenses and they don't 99 00:04:41,410 --> 00:04:44,528 get unlimited tries at that because they're trying to 100 00:04:44,528 --> 00:04:47,234 go across the landscape. And Ryan, do you have 101 00:04:47,234 --> 00:04:50,058 any thoughts about, outside what Chad said, ways 102 00:04:50,058 --> 00:04:53,293 that AI might be changing how we or other organizations 103 00:04:53,293 --> 00:04:55,705 are thinking about how they're protecting 104 00:04:55,705 --> 00:04:58,881 their assets? I think that there's also opportunity to 105 00:04:58,881 --> 00:05:01,646 leverage AI to accelerate our security response 106 00:05:01,646 --> 00:05:05,117 activity. Having the ability to automate and operationalize 107 00:05:05,117 --> 00:05:08,058 what were previously manual tasks is a significant 108 00:05:08,058 --> 00:05:11,234 advantage for defenders. So Chad's point around really 109 00:05:11,234 --> 00:05:14,234 understanding our networks, it's also understanding 110 00:05:14,234 --> 00:05:17,175 deeply our incident response processes and linking 111 00:05:17,175 --> 00:05:19,940 those together using AI, whether it's to put in 112 00:05:19,940 --> 00:05:22,234 play automated response playbooks or to 113 00:05:22,234 --> 00:05:24,646 enrich context that analysts need to make 114 00:05:24,646 --> 00:05:27,470 high confidence decision. AI helps with a lot of 115 00:05:27,470 --> 00:05:30,646 those tasks. And that, as a resource, wasn't available 116 00:05:30,646 --> 00:05:33,822 to us before. So it's really about maximizing whatever 117 00:05:33,822 --> 00:05:37,057 tools are available to us to do the job. I would add to 118 00:05:37,057 --> 00:05:39,939 that, Ryan, that automation is great. And I think 119 00:05:39,939 --> 00:05:43,115 one of the things that's important, though, is to make 120 00:05:43,115 --> 00:05:46,174 sure that you're automating a good thing. And if you 121 00:05:46,174 --> 00:05:49,174 automate something that's not good faster, you kind 122 00:05:49,174 --> 00:05:51,939 of fail faster in a bad way. I think one of the 123 00:05:51,939 --> 00:05:55,351 things that we do really well here, I think it's thanks to 124 00:05:55,351 --> 00:05:58,527 the culture that you helped set up, is that we iterate 125 00:05:58,527 --> 00:06:00,821 a lot through practice. We have regular 126 00:06:00,821 --> 00:06:02,997 tabletop exercises. We go through and 127 00:06:02,997 --> 00:06:06,997 review the runbooks and the playbooks that we have. We set ourselves 128 00:06:06,997 --> 00:06:08,997 up for success by having practiced 129 00:06:08,997 --> 00:06:11,350 communication, by having practiced going 130 00:06:11,350 --> 00:06:14,174 through these things. And then most importantly, 131 00:06:14,174 --> 00:06:16,762 when things don't go right, because nobody's 132 00:06:16,762 --> 00:06:19,174 perfect, everybody stumbles every once in 133 00:06:19,174 --> 00:06:22,233 a while, we go through a pretty good lessons learned 134 00:06:22,233 --> 00:06:24,704 cycle where we learn from the mistakes and 135 00:06:24,704 --> 00:06:27,292 then put corrections into place. And I think 136 00:06:27,292 --> 00:06:29,998 that's a really important aspect of automation 137 00:06:29,998 --> 00:06:32,763 because that way when we automate things, we're 138 00:06:32,763 --> 00:06:35,704 automating the right things. Chad, that's a really 139 00:06:35,704 --> 00:06:38,704 great point. I would say that iterative improvement 140 00:06:38,704 --> 00:06:41,292 is really the name of the game when it comes 141 00:06:41,292 --> 00:06:43,998 to incident response. One of the few corporate 142 00:06:43,998 --> 00:06:46,586 functions, if you think of it this way, that 143 00:06:46,586 --> 00:06:49,351 really has a whole vast group of people who are 144 00:06:49,351 --> 00:06:52,233 striving to make us fail. Finance can't say that, 145 00:06:52,233 --> 00:06:55,292 sales can't say that, etc. On the security side, our 146 00:06:55,292 --> 00:06:58,468 adversaries are seeking to find weaknesses and they're 147 00:06:58,468 --> 00:07:01,350 seeking to take advantage of us absolutely at our 148 00:07:01,350 --> 00:07:04,526 worst in order for us to ensure that we're giving them 149 00:07:04,526 --> 00:07:07,467 as few chances as we can. You're absolutely right, 150 00:07:07,467 --> 00:07:10,467 have a very strong focus on continuing improvement, 151 00:07:10,467 --> 00:07:13,467 on iterative improvement, deep analysis of root and 152 00:07:13,467 --> 00:07:16,232 contributing causes when there's a near miss or 153 00:07:16,232 --> 00:07:19,291 anything along those lines. And I think we've done a 154 00:07:19,291 --> 00:07:22,409 really great job rolling that back into our processes 155 00:07:22,409 --> 00:07:25,527 so that we're always improving. And most importantly, 156 00:07:25,527 --> 00:07:28,174 I'd say staying agile in the face of a lot of 157 00:07:28,174 --> 00:07:31,115 change out there right now. Yeah. Chad, you talked 158 00:07:31,115 --> 00:07:33,291 about automating a good thing. I know 159 00:07:33,291 --> 00:07:35,585 we talk a lot here about security of AI 160 00:07:35,585 --> 00:07:38,350 and security with AI. The security with AI is a 161 00:07:38,350 --> 00:07:41,291 good opportunity to use AI to do things that we do 162 00:07:41,291 --> 00:07:44,291 well, right? Pen testing, anything like that. But I 163 00:07:44,291 --> 00:07:47,232 think on the opposite side, while we're doing that 164 00:07:47,232 --> 00:07:50,291 iterative improvement to use AI to better ourselves, 165 00:07:50,291 --> 00:07:53,115 I think the adversaries are also doing that. And 166 00:07:53,115 --> 00:07:56,468 they're getting better at things like social engineering, 167 00:07:56,468 --> 00:07:59,115 phishing, deep fakes, impersonation attempts, 168 00:07:59,115 --> 00:08:02,174 making it more convincing. And so with that in mind, 169 00:08:02,174 --> 00:08:05,174 how do we, staying secure, how do we defend against 170 00:08:05,174 --> 00:08:08,056 those kinds of activities? What else should we be 171 00:08:08,056 --> 00:08:11,115 doing to take advantage of AI while still projecting 172 00:08:11,115 --> 00:08:13,880 against things like deep fakes or impersonation 173 00:08:13,880 --> 00:08:16,468 attempts? I think the theme is, I don't know 174 00:08:16,468 --> 00:08:18,997 that that much changed. AI has advanced the 175 00:08:18,997 --> 00:08:21,585 tradecraft, but tricking people is as old as 176 00:08:21,585 --> 00:08:24,409 time. I'm sure none of us have done it, but back 177 00:08:24,409 --> 00:08:27,056 in the day, if you wanted to get into a club, 178 00:08:27,056 --> 00:08:29,821 you'd have a fake ID. So humans are predisposed 179 00:08:29,821 --> 00:08:32,174 into trying to trick people into getting 180 00:08:32,174 --> 00:08:34,645 things that they want. AI is making that a 181 00:08:34,645 --> 00:08:37,057 little bit easier to do remotely. I mean, 182 00:08:37,057 --> 00:08:39,586 we're all remote. So it's entirely possible 183 00:08:39,586 --> 00:08:41,821 that one of us is fake, but we're not, 184 00:08:41,821 --> 00:08:44,115 as far as you know. Or this is a really 185 00:08:44,115 --> 00:08:46,939 good deep fake. But questioning the assumptions, 186 00:08:46,939 --> 00:08:49,468 what do you take for granted? It used to be 187 00:08:49,468 --> 00:08:52,174 back in the day that look for spelling errors, 188 00:08:52,174 --> 00:08:54,468 look for glitches. But right now, given 189 00:08:54,468 --> 00:08:56,997 enough time and effort, anybody can craft a 190 00:08:56,997 --> 00:09:00,350 perfect message to somebody using imagery that is totally 191 00:09:00,350 --> 00:09:03,350 believable using voices that are totally believable 192 00:09:03,350 --> 00:09:05,703 so we just have to educate question what 193 00:09:05,703 --> 00:09:08,350 we're assuming to be true and I think we do a 194 00:09:08,350 --> 00:09:11,409 good job of that here by periodically putting on our 195 00:09:11,409 --> 00:09:14,174 bad guy hats and thinking through sessions that 196 00:09:14,174 --> 00:09:17,292 we call unknown unknowns that we go through scenarios 197 00:09:17,292 --> 00:09:20,116 like this actually where we put ourselves in the 198 00:09:20,116 --> 00:09:22,881 place of an adversary and go, okay, what is the 199 00:09:22,881 --> 00:09:25,410 adversary trying to do? What would we do if 200 00:09:25,410 --> 00:09:27,586 we were trying to accomplish the same 201 00:09:27,586 --> 00:09:29,586 thing? How would we detect it? How 202 00:09:29,586 --> 00:09:30,704 would we defend it? 203 00:09:30,704 --> 00:09:34,175 So being proactive, I think, is the summary answer of that. 204 00:09:34,175 --> 00:09:35,704 I'll add just a few things 205 00:09:35,704 --> 00:09:38,528 to your question, Ashley. It's really the reason 206 00:09:38,528 --> 00:09:41,410 why we decided to create a deepfake of one of our 207 00:09:41,410 --> 00:09:44,645 executives to show the whole company on a recent Global 208 00:09:44,645 --> 00:09:47,763 All Hands event. And it's not so much that it was fun 209 00:09:47,763 --> 00:09:50,998 to do, which it absolutely was. But the goal was really 210 00:09:50,998 --> 00:09:53,880 to ensure that the entire company understands the 211 00:09:53,880 --> 00:09:57,056 state of what's possible using AI to create deepfakes. 212 00:09:57,056 --> 00:10:00,115 When I did the Global All Hands, I referenced a real 213 00:10:00,115 --> 00:10:02,939 news story where there was a midsize engineering 214 00:10:02,939 --> 00:10:06,115 firm and a finance person received a note of a request 215 00:10:06,115 --> 00:10:09,233 from their CFO to wire $25 million to an account. And 216 00:10:09,233 --> 00:10:12,057 before he had a chance to really get too nervous 217 00:10:12,057 --> 00:10:15,175 about it, he got a meeting invite from the CFO. So he 218 00:10:15,175 --> 00:10:18,351 joins this Zoom call and there's the CFO and a handful 219 00:10:18,351 --> 00:10:20,880 of his colleagues. And they have this brief 220 00:10:20,880 --> 00:10:24,174 discussion on the nature of the wire transfer. He asks a 221 00:10:24,174 --> 00:10:27,409 few questions and gets some answers and ultimately gets 222 00:10:27,409 --> 00:10:30,468 comfortable with the wire transfer. But as you know, 223 00:10:30,468 --> 00:10:33,527 the punchline, he was the only human on the call. So 224 00:10:33,527 --> 00:10:36,292 for our employees to hear that things like that 225 00:10:36,292 --> 00:10:39,468 have actually happened, of course, not to us, and then 226 00:10:39,468 --> 00:10:42,586 see a deep fake video that we created of our CFO with 227 00:10:42,586 --> 00:10:45,762 a couple tells in there just to keep it funny, I think 228 00:10:45,762 --> 00:10:48,938 really helps raise awareness to a level that hopefully 229 00:10:48,938 --> 00:10:51,526 brings some common understanding of what the 230 00:10:51,526 --> 00:10:54,526 state of possible looks like today, which is pretty 231 00:10:54,526 --> 00:10:57,820 convincing and a little scary. And Ryan, just to pull on 232 00:10:57,820 --> 00:11:01,114 that thread a little bit, that goes back to preparation, 233 00:11:01,114 --> 00:11:03,761 right? We're having the employees be prepared 234 00:11:03,761 --> 00:11:06,408 for that. And you mentioned incident response 235 00:11:06,408 --> 00:11:09,467 before. I think one of the things that we do well is 236 00:11:09,467 --> 00:11:12,585 preparing for the fight, that there is the difference 237 00:11:12,585 --> 00:11:15,467 between the academics of going into a fight where 238 00:11:15,467 --> 00:11:18,585 you read about how to fight, You study some videos of 239 00:11:18,585 --> 00:11:21,644 it versus going to the gym, lifting weights, getting 240 00:11:21,644 --> 00:11:24,997 in the boxing ring and be ready to fight. I think there's 241 00:11:24,997 --> 00:11:27,879 a big difference between academically being ready 242 00:11:27,879 --> 00:11:30,879 and then actually having gone through the fight. If 243 00:11:30,879 --> 00:11:33,761 you're preparing to have a boxing match with Mike 244 00:11:33,761 --> 00:11:36,702 Tyson or the world champion, there's going to be a 245 00:11:36,702 --> 00:11:39,761 difference of somebody who sparred, somebody who got 246 00:11:39,761 --> 00:11:43,232 in the boxing ring and boxed versus somebody who read about 247 00:11:43,232 --> 00:11:45,997 it. Because at some point, you are going to get 248 00:11:45,997 --> 00:11:48,997 punched in the face by the bad guy. and that's part 249 00:11:48,997 --> 00:11:52,115 of resilience that at some point we are going to take 250 00:11:52,115 --> 00:11:55,468 that hit to the face by the bad guy and when that happens 251 00:11:55,468 --> 00:11:58,350 we have prepared we're not going to crumble we're 252 00:11:58,350 --> 00:12:01,350 going to keep going forward and we're going to stay 253 00:12:01,350 --> 00:12:04,291 in the fight it's going to hurt but we're going to 254 00:12:04,291 --> 00:12:07,526 stumble but we're not going to fail and I think that is 255 00:12:07,526 --> 00:12:10,585 one of the key parts of resilience is staying in the 256 00:12:10,585 --> 00:12:13,585 fight staying in the game staying operational and I 257 00:12:13,585 --> 00:12:16,703 think we've got a really good culture of that mindset 258 00:12:16,703 --> 00:12:19,585 and have practiced that in small doses is that we 259 00:12:19,585 --> 00:12:22,703 don't talk so much about how do you get back up. It's 260 00:12:22,703 --> 00:12:25,821 important to have backups. It's important to restore. 261 00:12:25,821 --> 00:12:28,939 But I think one of the things that we emphasize is we 262 00:12:28,939 --> 00:12:31,939 are going to stay in the fight. We're going to stay 263 00:12:31,939 --> 00:12:34,998 operational. We're going to remain resilient. We are 264 00:12:34,998 --> 00:12:37,998 not going to just lie down and be done and wait for 265 00:12:37,998 --> 00:12:41,233 things to get going. We're going to keep going and take 266 00:12:41,233 --> 00:12:44,586 action. I think as it relates to resilience, it should be 267 00:12:44,586 --> 00:12:47,586 everybody's responsibility, right? And I think that 268 00:12:47,586 --> 00:12:50,586 we in security know that security and resilience is 269 00:12:50,586 --> 00:12:53,762 everybody's responsibility. But a lot of organizations 270 00:12:53,762 --> 00:12:56,291 have kind of always pushed it to like, hey, 271 00:12:56,291 --> 00:12:59,644 security and IT can figure that out. Hey, security and IT 272 00:12:59,644 --> 00:13:02,703 can make sure we're good. And Ryan, you talked a bit 273 00:13:02,703 --> 00:13:05,821 about it with the deepfake scenario and why you chose 274 00:13:05,821 --> 00:13:09,115 to share that in the Global All Hands because you wanted 275 00:13:09,115 --> 00:13:12,233 every employee to understand the risk. But let's talk 276 00:13:12,233 --> 00:13:15,292 a little bit about why businesses need to understand 277 00:13:15,292 --> 00:13:18,174 that it's everybody's responsibility to make sure 278 00:13:18,174 --> 00:13:21,174 we're resilient and it's everybody's responsibility 279 00:13:21,174 --> 00:13:24,292 to make sure we're secure and not just depending on a 280 00:13:24,292 --> 00:13:27,233 secure digital infrastructure. Yeah, it's a really 281 00:13:27,233 --> 00:13:29,586 good point. And I would say what kind of 282 00:13:29,586 --> 00:13:31,762 level sets it for me is the fact that 283 00:13:31,762 --> 00:13:34,586 everyone is a target. So there are no bystanders 284 00:13:34,586 --> 00:13:36,880 in cybersecurity. Everyone is a target, 285 00:13:36,880 --> 00:13:39,998 everyone has a role to play, and everyone has to have 286 00:13:39,998 --> 00:13:42,939 a level of awareness and capability to ensure that 287 00:13:42,939 --> 00:13:46,351 they are at least not becoming a significant risk. I think 288 00:13:46,351 --> 00:13:49,351 there's plenty of chances for people to demonstrate 289 00:13:49,351 --> 00:13:52,292 significant value and to contribute to a company's 290 00:13:52,292 --> 00:13:55,233 security mission, but ultimately they can't be the 291 00:13:55,233 --> 00:13:58,233 weakest link in the chain. So there's a lot of work 292 00:13:58,233 --> 00:14:00,998 that goes into ensuring that we are inculcating 293 00:14:00,998 --> 00:14:04,116 security awareness into really almost every aspect of 294 00:14:04,116 --> 00:14:07,057 our employee experience. There's new hire training 295 00:14:07,057 --> 00:14:10,175 that happens. There's, of course, our annual security 296 00:14:10,175 --> 00:14:13,469 awareness month. But there's a lot of material that goes 297 00:14:13,469 --> 00:14:16,234 on throughout the year, whether it's focused on 298 00:14:16,234 --> 00:14:19,410 secure development and how to write secure code or our 299 00:14:19,410 --> 00:14:22,586 monthly phishing campaigns, which everyone, of course, 300 00:14:22,586 --> 00:14:25,880 loves. And a lot of real -time training that's delivered 301 00:14:25,880 --> 00:14:28,762 throughout the rest of the year. And I think that 302 00:14:28,762 --> 00:14:31,997 really helps keep everybody sharp and focused that they 303 00:14:31,997 --> 00:14:34,821 do have a role to play. And I think, in general, 304 00:14:34,821 --> 00:14:37,821 employees across the board have become aware enough 305 00:14:37,821 --> 00:14:41,174 that there are significant consequences to cyber attacks. 306 00:14:41,174 --> 00:14:43,939 There have been a number of companies that have 307 00:14:43,939 --> 00:14:47,351 recently had massive breaches and massive intrusions. Some 308 00:14:47,351 --> 00:14:50,469 of them have missed their ability to report financial 309 00:14:50,469 --> 00:14:53,587 numbers quarterly, publicly traded companies, because 310 00:14:53,587 --> 00:14:56,411 their financial systems have been down due to an 311 00:14:56,411 --> 00:14:59,882 attack. And that really impacts the bottom line and impacts 312 00:14:59,882 --> 00:15:02,588 businesses that people really are committed to 313 00:15:02,588 --> 00:15:05,529 and want to see do well. I think one of the things 314 00:15:05,529 --> 00:15:08,705 that's actually we're talking about the employees, but 315 00:15:08,705 --> 00:15:11,764 I think, Ryan, you made me think that it goes beyond 316 00:15:11,764 --> 00:15:15,117 just within Ciena. We have so many interdependencies with 317 00:15:15,117 --> 00:15:18,117 our vendors, suppliers, different partners that are 318 00:15:18,117 --> 00:15:21,235 part of the cyber fight, that having those open lines 319 00:15:21,235 --> 00:15:24,294 of communication, like when something goes wrong, or 320 00:15:24,294 --> 00:15:27,118 even before something goes wrong, the sharing of 321 00:15:27,118 --> 00:15:30,412 information with our customers, with our suppliers, with 322 00:15:30,412 --> 00:15:33,706 our vendors. I think we are really good at that in terms 323 00:15:33,706 --> 00:15:36,706 of staying in the fight together. I think that's an 324 00:15:36,706 --> 00:15:39,882 important piece. It's very important for the employees 325 00:15:39,882 --> 00:15:43,117 to be involved, but there are so many interdependencies 326 00:15:43,117 --> 00:15:46,529 globally that it is incumbent upon all of us to have those 327 00:15:46,529 --> 00:15:49,529 clear lines of communication, to go through some of 328 00:15:49,529 --> 00:15:52,470 those what-if scenarios about, right, if something 329 00:15:52,470 --> 00:15:55,764 happens, how are we going to interact with each other as 330 00:15:55,764 --> 00:15:58,940 partners, suppliers, vendors, and so forth. So I think 331 00:15:58,940 --> 00:16:02,058 this extends beyond that. And then I'll add one other 332 00:16:02,058 --> 00:16:05,176 thing to that that I think is a differentiator for us 333 00:16:05,176 --> 00:16:08,176 internally when it comes to incident response is we 334 00:16:08,176 --> 00:16:11,470 have something that we refer to as the extended security 335 00:16:11,470 --> 00:16:14,588 incident response team, the ESIRT, where we meet with 336 00:16:14,588 --> 00:16:17,706 all of the stakeholders on a regular basis so that we 337 00:16:17,706 --> 00:16:21,118 have relationships. that I think a theme that's resonating 338 00:16:21,118 --> 00:16:24,118 from all of my comments are there is a through line 339 00:16:24,118 --> 00:16:26,942 for the human element in all of this, that AI is 340 00:16:26,942 --> 00:16:30,295 important, the technology, the tools, but it really comes 341 00:16:30,295 --> 00:16:33,471 down to the human elements and being able to trust and 342 00:16:33,471 --> 00:16:36,589 rely on each other and know how we work together in a 343 00:16:36,589 --> 00:16:39,589 crisis before the crisis happens. And I think we've 344 00:16:39,589 --> 00:16:42,765 done a really good job of that. I think that's a great 345 00:16:42,765 --> 00:16:45,824 lesson learned from us. Yeah, I think we've had some 346 00:16:45,824 --> 00:16:49,059 great examples or scenarios where we've engaged in ESIR 347 00:16:49,059 --> 00:16:52,294 activity or extended incident response activity to make 348 00:16:52,294 --> 00:16:55,294 sure that we have the right business folks involved 349 00:16:55,294 --> 00:16:58,353 if something were to occur and make sure we know who 350 00:16:58,353 --> 00:17:01,588 we reach out to. And I think the building relationships 351 00:17:01,588 --> 00:17:04,647 is an interesting point and that comes to how we try 352 00:17:04,647 --> 00:17:08,000 to build our relationships with our customers or with our 353 00:17:08,000 --> 00:17:10,941 peers or government agencies so that we understand 354 00:17:10,941 --> 00:17:14,176 what's going on in the area. But what does it look like 355 00:17:14,176 --> 00:17:17,470 in practice for, I'm thinking mostly about our customers 356 00:17:17,470 --> 00:17:20,411 and our customers depend on this always on digital 357 00:17:20,411 --> 00:17:23,529 infrastructure. They can't go down sometimes to patch 358 00:17:23,529 --> 00:17:26,823 or it takes a long time or they need certain maintenance 359 00:17:26,823 --> 00:17:29,764 windows. How do we do all of that in practice? How 360 00:17:29,764 --> 00:17:32,764 do those organizations make sure that they're still 361 00:17:32,764 --> 00:17:36,058 resilient in practice? Is it the security awareness type 362 00:17:36,058 --> 00:17:39,058 training and communication building you guys talked 363 00:17:39,058 --> 00:17:42,176 about? Are there other things that customers or other 364 00:17:42,176 --> 00:17:45,764 businesses can be doing to make sure that they stay resilient 365 00:17:45,764 --> 00:17:48,646 and can withstand and recover from a cyber event? 366 00:17:48,646 --> 00:17:51,764 Really, the key point is avoiding the accumulation of 367 00:17:51,764 --> 00:17:54,882 security and process technical debt. So when you have 368 00:17:54,882 --> 00:17:57,823 organizations who are not proactively investing in 369 00:17:57,823 --> 00:18:01,117 security. And I say that broadly, it can be something as 370 00:18:01,117 --> 00:18:04,293 simple as maintaining current platforms, ensuring that 371 00:18:04,293 --> 00:18:07,705 things are patched properly, ensuring that you have a deep 372 00:18:07,705 --> 00:18:10,411 understanding of how your network architecture 373 00:18:10,411 --> 00:18:13,823 works, and that it's really aligned to modern day security 374 00:18:13,823 --> 00:18:16,999 reference architectures. Things like that have changed 375 00:18:16,999 --> 00:18:20,234 dramatically in the last 10 to 15 years. We don't build 376 00:18:20,234 --> 00:18:23,352 secure networks the same way we did 10, 15 years ago. 377 00:18:23,352 --> 00:18:26,587 So there's a lot of work that happens in the background 378 00:18:26,587 --> 00:18:29,822 that is not always very exciting. It's the fundamentals 379 00:18:29,822 --> 00:18:32,587 and the basics that allow organizations to keep 380 00:18:32,587 --> 00:18:35,822 pace and ensure that they can remain agile when they do 381 00:18:35,822 --> 00:18:38,940 need to make changes. So you mentioned about customer 382 00:18:38,940 --> 00:18:41,646 networks. We find a very wide range across our 383 00:18:41,646 --> 00:18:45,175 customers. There are those that have kept pace with patches, 384 00:18:45,175 --> 00:18:48,116 that have an understanding of adversary tactics in 385 00:18:48,116 --> 00:18:51,645 their environments and across the industry, and that they've 386 00:18:51,645 --> 00:18:54,763 really learned from that and integrated some of those 387 00:18:54,763 --> 00:18:57,763 lessons learned into how they think about building, 388 00:18:57,763 --> 00:19:00,763 operating, and maintaining their environments. Then 389 00:19:00,763 --> 00:19:03,822 there are other customers who have prioritized other 390 00:19:03,822 --> 00:19:07,057 aspects of the business above patching and managing and 391 00:19:07,057 --> 00:19:10,351 maintaining their networks. And I suspect a lot of those 392 00:19:10,351 --> 00:19:13,822 customers are paying a larger price due to the accumulation 393 00:19:13,822 --> 00:19:16,587 of technical debt in some of their environments 394 00:19:16,587 --> 00:19:19,705 that now they're kind of scrambling that they need to 395 00:19:19,705 --> 00:19:22,940 go off and pay that down. So they can really go off and 396 00:19:22,940 --> 00:19:26,116 adapt to some of the evolving risk in this space. So I 397 00:19:26,116 --> 00:19:28,998 think for me, it really does boil down to staying 398 00:19:28,998 --> 00:19:32,292 proactive in this area. And a lot of organizations don't 399 00:19:32,292 --> 00:19:35,292 want to make significant investments in security or 400 00:19:35,292 --> 00:19:38,586 prioritize it until after they've had a massive incident 401 00:19:38,586 --> 00:19:41,704 or a breach. And I would argue that's the second best 402 00:19:41,704 --> 00:19:45,057 time to do it. The first best time is to do it way before 403 00:19:45,057 --> 00:19:48,116 the incident or the breach so that you can avoid not 404 00:19:48,116 --> 00:19:51,175 only the damage to reputation and operations and the 405 00:19:51,175 --> 00:19:53,940 cascading impacts to customers, but those large 406 00:19:53,940 --> 00:19:57,234 -scale security incidents have a massively long tail and 407 00:19:57,234 --> 00:20:00,293 usually a very big legal bill. So I think culture is 408 00:20:00,293 --> 00:20:02,940 part of that, right? You have to get security 409 00:20:02,940 --> 00:20:05,528 culture so that your business, your leaders, 410 00:20:05,528 --> 00:20:08,469 et cetera, jump into that mindset before something 411 00:20:08,469 --> 00:20:11,057 occurs. You mentioned a little bit about our 412 00:20:11,057 --> 00:20:14,057 awareness program and some of that. I think we do a 413 00:20:14,057 --> 00:20:16,998 really good job here, but I think security culture 414 00:20:16,998 --> 00:20:20,351 and communications is so important to make sure everybody 415 00:20:20,351 --> 00:20:23,292 understands what's going on, but not just for your 416 00:20:23,292 --> 00:20:25,998 employees, right? Like you want your employees 417 00:20:25,998 --> 00:20:29,116 to be aware, but you also have to kind of lead up and 418 00:20:29,116 --> 00:20:32,234 make sure that your executive team is ready to invest 419 00:20:32,234 --> 00:20:34,999 in security in a way that's meaningful. So talk 420 00:20:34,999 --> 00:20:38,117 a little bit, either of you, about what roles you see 421 00:20:38,117 --> 00:20:41,117 that playing and how would you recommend folks send 422 00:20:41,117 --> 00:20:43,823 that message? We are absolutely blessed with a 423 00:20:43,823 --> 00:20:46,882 highly engaged executive team and also a very highly 424 00:20:46,882 --> 00:20:50,000 engaged board of directors. So delivering the message 425 00:20:50,000 --> 00:20:53,000 that security is important and ultimately is linked 426 00:20:53,000 --> 00:20:55,706 to Ciena's reputation across the industry, the 427 00:20:55,706 --> 00:20:58,941 resilience of our ability to deliver on our commitments 428 00:20:58,941 --> 00:21:01,765 to customers, and I'd say our ability to protect 429 00:21:01,765 --> 00:21:04,530 our industry leading intellectual property is a 430 00:21:04,530 --> 00:21:07,648 message that is well-received across the board in the 431 00:21:07,648 --> 00:21:10,589 ELT. We have benefited significantly over the last 432 00:21:10,589 --> 00:21:13,471 couple of years from, I'd say, large investments, 433 00:21:13,471 --> 00:21:16,589 not only across technology platforms, but also on the 434 00:21:16,589 --> 00:21:19,648 people side to where we can, we've been able to grow 435 00:21:19,648 --> 00:21:22,236 the security program and implement the right 436 00:21:22,236 --> 00:21:25,530 technologies to really reduce risk across the board. I'd 437 00:21:25,530 --> 00:21:28,706 say there's a few things that really tends to resonate 438 00:21:28,706 --> 00:21:31,471 with the executive team. One is, again, that it 439 00:21:31,471 --> 00:21:34,589 matters to our customers. We've had a lot of customer 440 00:21:34,589 --> 00:21:37,589 calls recently. I really take a lot of time to meet 441 00:21:37,589 --> 00:21:40,648 with our customer security executives, and they want 442 00:21:40,648 --> 00:21:43,472 a level of confidence and they want an assurance 443 00:21:43,472 --> 00:21:46,413 that Ciena is operating a robust security program. 444 00:21:46,413 --> 00:21:49,295 It really matters to them. So that, of course, is 445 00:21:49,295 --> 00:21:52,648 important. There's also a lot of regulatory pressure, not 446 00:21:52,648 --> 00:21:55,883 only for various different regions in which we operate, 447 00:21:55,883 --> 00:21:58,471 but I would say more broadly, the ability to 448 00:21:58,471 --> 00:22:01,883 demonstrate that we're operating a commercially reasonable 449 00:22:01,883 --> 00:22:04,648 security program and exercising due care really 450 00:22:04,648 --> 00:22:08,060 matters to our executive team. They want to reduce risk to 451 00:22:08,060 --> 00:22:10,884 the company, and they know that in many ways, as 452 00:22:10,884 --> 00:22:14,119 we are pressing through unprecedented growth and scale, 453 00:22:14,119 --> 00:22:17,237 that security is protecting the path that the company 454 00:22:17,237 --> 00:22:20,355 is taking, not only for us to continue to gain market 455 00:22:20,355 --> 00:22:23,473 share, but also to meet tremendously growing customer 456 00:22:23,473 --> 00:22:26,532 demand. To continue to pull on that thread as far as 457 00:22:26,532 --> 00:22:29,591 like the leadership aspects of that and the cultural 458 00:22:29,591 --> 00:22:32,767 aspects of that. I think some of the things that allow 459 00:22:32,767 --> 00:22:35,943 what Ryan just talked about is having the trust of the 460 00:22:35,943 --> 00:22:39,061 team. Our leadership is able to detach, step back and 461 00:22:39,061 --> 00:22:41,943 look at the bigger picture. There is a great deal 462 00:22:41,943 --> 00:22:44,884 of trust in the whole organization to do the right 463 00:22:44,884 --> 00:22:48,237 thing, to be aligned and moving in the right direction. I 464 00:22:48,237 --> 00:22:51,355 think that's hugely important because there is a fine 465 00:22:51,355 --> 00:22:54,590 balance between the leaders being hands on the keyboard 466 00:22:54,590 --> 00:22:57,472 right there in the weeds versus stepping back and 467 00:22:57,472 --> 00:23:00,531 taking a look at what's happening. And I think being 468 00:23:00,531 --> 00:23:03,413 able to detach and look around has enabled almost 469 00:23:03,413 --> 00:23:06,707 all of those things that Ryan just talked about, is that 470 00:23:06,707 --> 00:23:09,648 we were able to see the bigger picture and be able 471 00:23:09,648 --> 00:23:12,824 to do those things. And Ryan, as you were talking, one 472 00:23:12,824 --> 00:23:16,000 of the other themes that I think popped out in my mind 473 00:23:16,000 --> 00:23:19,294 is adaptability, that the team, the company, the culture 474 00:23:19,294 --> 00:23:22,353 is adaptable to changing environments. I don't think 475 00:23:22,353 --> 00:23:25,471 if you look back 20 years ago in Ciena's history that 476 00:23:25,471 --> 00:23:28,412 it would have envisioned that we are exactly where 477 00:23:28,412 --> 00:23:31,471 we are right now. But the company continues to adapt 478 00:23:31,471 --> 00:23:34,530 to changes. The security function continues to adapt 479 00:23:34,530 --> 00:23:37,530 to changes. And that's all part of being resilient, 480 00:23:37,530 --> 00:23:40,589 right? That we didn't just get stuck on our ways. We 481 00:23:40,589 --> 00:23:43,765 stepped back and looked and said, all right, we've got 482 00:23:43,765 --> 00:23:46,765 to change a little bit. We're going to focus on the 483 00:23:46,765 --> 00:23:49,765 fundamentals, as we've talked about. But we're also 484 00:23:49,765 --> 00:23:52,824 going to adapt to the newer tools and then smash cut 485 00:23:52,824 --> 00:23:55,942 20 years from now, it'll be different tools, but some 486 00:23:55,942 --> 00:23:58,942 of those fundamentals will still be in place and we 487 00:23:58,942 --> 00:24:02,060 will be adaptable and we are already looking ahead at 488 00:24:02,060 --> 00:24:05,413 things that are going to change and we're not going to be 489 00:24:05,413 --> 00:24:09,589 caught behind the curve. Yeah, that's a great point. I think when we're 490 00:24:09,589 --> 00:24:11,530 looking ahead, Chad, I think your 491 00:24:11,530 --> 00:24:14,059 perspective is going to be the same, right? 492 00:24:14,059 --> 00:24:16,647 In 20 years, we need to be just as adaptable 493 00:24:16,647 --> 00:24:18,706 as today. It's just going to be new 494 00:24:18,706 --> 00:24:21,294 tools, technologies, new tactics, et cetera. 495 00:24:21,294 --> 00:24:23,588 But also as we're thinking about what's 496 00:24:23,588 --> 00:24:25,882 next for the industry or for the threat 497 00:24:25,882 --> 00:24:28,764 landscape. What are you guys thinking about? What 498 00:24:28,764 --> 00:24:31,117 should customers be thinking about? What 499 00:24:31,117 --> 00:24:34,058 keeps you up at night? I'll go back to what I said 500 00:24:34,058 --> 00:24:36,999 about the scale and pace of change. Again, I think 501 00:24:36,999 --> 00:24:39,940 that's a continuum throughout humankind. And we're 502 00:24:39,940 --> 00:24:42,999 talking a little bit about cyber defense. So I think 503 00:24:42,999 --> 00:24:45,999 that's been a continuum. I think that will continue 504 00:24:45,999 --> 00:24:48,823 to change and scale up. That the access to tools 505 00:24:48,823 --> 00:24:51,823 and techniques is going to be easier. There's going 506 00:24:51,823 --> 00:24:54,823 to be broader access to knowledge and abilities. So 507 00:24:54,823 --> 00:24:57,764 that's going to mean there's more adversaries, but 508 00:24:57,764 --> 00:25:00,940 that same technology works downwards as well, that the 509 00:25:00,940 --> 00:25:03,881 defenders are going to be able to counter that. So 510 00:25:03,881 --> 00:25:06,940 it's going to be a continuous cat and mouse game. So 511 00:25:06,940 --> 00:25:09,705 that concerns me in the short term. And then we 512 00:25:09,705 --> 00:25:12,999 already talked about speed, being able to move at speed. 513 00:25:12,999 --> 00:25:15,881 But again, especially if you've been in this game 514 00:25:15,881 --> 00:25:18,999 for a while, that hasn't changed. The speed continues 515 00:25:18,999 --> 00:25:21,881 to keep going. There's never been a point in time 516 00:25:21,881 --> 00:25:24,881 where everybody said, yep, we're good. We got this. 517 00:25:24,881 --> 00:25:28,057 Like it's been a constant evolution. So I think that's 518 00:25:28,057 --> 00:25:30,822 going to continue. Ashley, you mentioned things 519 00:25:30,822 --> 00:25:33,704 that keep us up at night. I refer to that, as you 520 00:25:33,704 --> 00:25:36,939 know, as my nightmare list, which is a very, very long, 521 00:25:36,939 --> 00:25:40,057 many, many pages of things I worry about. I would say 522 00:25:40,057 --> 00:25:42,822 there's a lot of things tactically that I worry 523 00:25:42,822 --> 00:25:46,234 about. And I worry less about those things because in many 524 00:25:46,234 --> 00:25:49,293 ways, we are able to take action. We have an amazing 525 00:25:49,293 --> 00:25:52,293 team. And as I said, we have great support from our 526 00:25:52,293 --> 00:25:55,646 executive leadership team and our board. So when there is 527 00:25:55,646 --> 00:25:58,822 a risk, we're able to ask for resources and ultimately 528 00:25:58,822 --> 00:26:01,881 make change. We have great peers and partners across 529 00:26:01,881 --> 00:26:04,822 IT, across R&D, and across the product side. And I 530 00:26:04,822 --> 00:26:08,175 think we've done a great job making a compelling case for 531 00:26:08,175 --> 00:26:11,351 why things need to be done. So what's left is the fear 532 00:26:11,351 --> 00:26:14,175 of being strategically outflanked. And Chad, you 533 00:26:14,175 --> 00:26:17,234 mentioned our unknown unknowns meeting. I think that 534 00:26:17,234 --> 00:26:20,528 captures it well. And the goal of that meeting is really 535 00:26:20,528 --> 00:26:23,528 to do our best to address that concern around being 536 00:26:23,528 --> 00:26:26,763 strategically outflanked. It's to really be intentional 537 00:26:26,763 --> 00:26:29,881 and think about what are we missing? What is going to 538 00:26:29,881 --> 00:26:33,057 come out of left field that we all say that was not on 539 00:26:33,057 --> 00:26:35,998 my bingo card for 2027 and wish we would have done 540 00:26:35,998 --> 00:26:39,057 something different to, as we've been talking about, 541 00:26:39,057 --> 00:26:42,528 prepare for it or mitigate the likelihood or impact of that 542 00:26:42,528 --> 00:26:45,704 type of event occurring. And despite being intentional 543 00:26:45,704 --> 00:26:48,469 about it and having these discussions over many 544 00:26:48,469 --> 00:26:51,881 hours, I still worry about being strategically outflanked, 545 00:26:51,881 --> 00:26:54,881 whether it's through an adversary or an operational 546 00:26:54,881 --> 00:26:57,940 issue or something we just didn't think about. So we 547 00:26:57,940 --> 00:27:00,881 will continue to spend more time on that. And that 548 00:27:00,881 --> 00:27:04,352 unfortunately is just, I think it really represents the gap 549 00:27:04,352 --> 00:27:07,352 between a level of comfort and a level of pervasive 550 00:27:07,352 --> 00:27:10,470 and professional paranoia that I think is healthy and 551 00:27:10,470 --> 00:27:13,058 keeps us all on our toes. Yeah, complacency, 552 00:27:13,058 --> 00:27:15,646 to your point, Ryan, there is that danger of 553 00:27:15,646 --> 00:27:18,940 becoming complacent that I think is huge, that sometimes 554 00:27:18,940 --> 00:27:21,705 companies, individuals, security programs don't 555 00:27:21,705 --> 00:27:24,470 have anything and they go, oh, we're good. Like 556 00:27:24,470 --> 00:27:27,529 everything we're doing is working fine. I think that 557 00:27:27,529 --> 00:27:30,647 is, and you said something that comforted me greatly, 558 00:27:30,647 --> 00:27:33,412 which is you indicated you never stop worrying, 559 00:27:33,412 --> 00:27:36,059 right? I would be more concerned if you went, 560 00:27:36,059 --> 00:27:38,588 no, we're good. We got this. There's no way 561 00:27:38,588 --> 00:27:41,706 anybody's getting into our stuff, right? We have that 562 00:27:41,706 --> 00:27:44,530 healthy, reasonable level of paranoia that says, 563 00:27:44,530 --> 00:27:47,530 all right, you know what? Given enough time, money, 564 00:27:47,530 --> 00:27:50,589 and dedication, somebody's probably going to get in. 565 00:27:50,589 --> 00:27:53,648 So let's be able to detect it quicker and to be able 566 00:27:53,648 --> 00:27:56,883 to contain it faster so that we can minimize the impact 567 00:27:56,883 --> 00:27:59,589 that would have to our organization and to our 568 00:27:59,589 --> 00:28:02,824 customers. I think that's a huge point. To take it full 569 00:28:02,824 --> 00:28:05,765 circle to kind of where we started, I think that's 570 00:28:05,765 --> 00:28:08,765 one of the reasons why we really have been shifting 571 00:28:08,765 --> 00:28:12,000 our security strategy a bit. Unfortunately, we all need 572 00:28:12,000 --> 00:28:15,294 to get more comfortable with intrusions. It's just going 573 00:28:15,294 --> 00:28:18,176 to be easier for adversaries to gain unauthorized 574 00:28:18,176 --> 00:28:21,117 access to one resource or another. So when we talk 575 00:28:21,117 --> 00:28:24,470 about some of our large-scale initiatives like defensible 576 00:28:24,470 --> 00:28:27,411 network architecture, which as you know includes a 577 00:28:27,411 --> 00:28:30,587 lot of network segmentation and micro-segmentation and 578 00:28:30,587 --> 00:28:33,469 instrumenting for response and east-west security 579 00:28:33,469 --> 00:28:36,587 controls instead of just thinking about the perimeter 580 00:28:36,587 --> 00:28:39,763 being north-south, it really allows us to minimize the 581 00:28:39,763 --> 00:28:42,763 impact, scope, and duration of a security incident. 582 00:28:42,763 --> 00:28:45,645 And that ultimately is the goal. We know we can't 583 00:28:45,645 --> 00:28:48,880 prevent everything. But when something does happen, the 584 00:28:48,880 --> 00:28:52,174 objective is really to minimize the impact of that issue 585 00:28:52,174 --> 00:28:55,468 and get the organization back up on its feet, continuing 586 00:28:55,468 --> 00:28:58,468 that drive and strive towards resilience. And then, 587 00:28:58,468 --> 00:29:01,409 of course, to learn from any sort of shortcut. And 588 00:29:01,409 --> 00:29:04,762 it's not necessarily a control failure. It's an adversary 589 00:29:04,762 --> 00:29:07,938 finding a new tactic or a new technique to gain access 590 00:29:07,938 --> 00:29:10,762 and maintain it. There's just a lot of work that 591 00:29:10,762 --> 00:29:13,938 goes into this consistent and I'd say continuous focus 592 00:29:13,938 --> 00:29:16,938 on agility. Yeah, I love that. I think it goes back 593 00:29:16,938 --> 00:29:20,173 to the adaptability. I think some organizations, I know 594 00:29:20,173 --> 00:29:23,055 ones I've worked in in the past, you get stuck in 595 00:29:23,055 --> 00:29:26,173 a security program of just going towards the security 596 00:29:26,173 --> 00:29:29,173 objectives you've set and not thinking about how do 597 00:29:29,173 --> 00:29:32,349 we change this because the environment is changing and 598 00:29:32,349 --> 00:29:36,525 the landscape is changing. So you're just like, well, I got to complete 599 00:29:36,525 --> 00:29:39,643 these goals. It takes away some of that. I don't want 600 00:29:39,643 --> 00:29:42,467 to call it complacency, but it's almost like you 601 00:29:42,467 --> 00:29:45,349 get stuck in a rut, which is important to get out 602 00:29:45,349 --> 00:29:48,173 of. And it's important to be able to change what 603 00:29:48,173 --> 00:29:51,114 you're doing and thinking about. I guess, thinking 604 00:29:51,114 --> 00:29:53,996 about our customers and our listeners, what's one 605 00:29:53,996 --> 00:29:56,878 key takeaway that each of you would want folks to 606 00:29:56,878 --> 00:29:59,760 remember about the future of cybersecurity or the 607 00:29:59,760 --> 00:30:02,760 threat landscape or resiliency or any of the things 608 00:30:02,760 --> 00:30:05,289 we've talked about today. From a resilience 609 00:30:05,289 --> 00:30:08,230 standpoint, I think one thing that's really key is 610 00:30:08,230 --> 00:30:11,289 that it's not permanent. Resilience has a half-life. 611 00:30:11,289 --> 00:30:13,995 There's never going to be a point where you're 612 00:30:13,995 --> 00:30:16,819 good. It's a continuum. So don't get complacent. 613 00:30:16,819 --> 00:30:20,290 Continue to practice. Continue to realize that you're going 614 00:30:20,290 --> 00:30:23,466 to have to be adaptable. So just realize that it's not 615 00:30:23,466 --> 00:30:26,290 permanent. It's a journey. And then we're all in 616 00:30:26,290 --> 00:30:29,584 together and just continue to build for being adaptable. 617 00:30:29,584 --> 00:30:32,525 Yeah, that's great stuff, Chad. I would add really 618 00:30:32,525 --> 00:30:35,819 it's about preparation and being proactive. A lot of the 619 00:30:35,819 --> 00:30:39,054 work that we do is anticipatory of adversaries shifting 620 00:30:39,054 --> 00:30:42,054 tactics, of adversaries targeting different things, 621 00:30:42,054 --> 00:30:45,172 of various different failure modes. One thing that we 622 00:30:45,172 --> 00:30:48,407 didn't get a chance to talk about is we maintain a full 623 00:30:48,407 --> 00:30:51,407 team of pen testers, of people whose sole job it is 624 00:30:51,407 --> 00:30:54,642 to role-play an aggressive and sophisticated adversary. 625 00:30:54,642 --> 00:30:57,701 And they use the same tools, tactics, and techniques 626 00:30:57,701 --> 00:31:00,583 as adversaries do against our environment and our 627 00:31:00,583 --> 00:31:03,995 products so that we can really have a tried and true field 628 00:31:03,995 --> 00:31:07,230 -tested understanding of what it is like to be targeted 629 00:31:07,230 --> 00:31:10,406 and attacked. And I think it speaks to that concept of 630 00:31:10,406 --> 00:31:13,524 really being proactive and not looking at it from the 631 00:31:13,524 --> 00:31:16,700 perspective of intellectual experience and focusing on 632 00:31:16,700 --> 00:31:19,876 it more of a true practical, how do we ensure that the 633 00:31:19,876 --> 00:31:22,582 defenses that we have in place are going to be 634 00:31:22,582 --> 00:31:25,994 effective when we are attacked? Well, I feel like we could 635 00:31:25,994 --> 00:31:28,876 talk about this for hours and hours on end, but I 636 00:31:28,876 --> 00:31:31,876 want to be mindful of the time of our listeners. So 637 00:31:31,876 --> 00:31:34,876 I want to thank you both for being here today, Chad 638 00:31:34,876 --> 00:31:37,994 Hunt, Ryan Hammer. Thank you again. My name is Ashley 639 00:31:37,994 --> 00:31:40,818 Wyand. Thank you everybody for your time and for 640 00:31:40,818 --> 00:31:43,936 listening. To our listeners, you can subscribe to our 641 00:31:43,936 --> 00:31:46,701 Ciena Insights podcast at Apple Podcasts and on 642 00:31:46,701 --> 00:31:50,819 Spotify. You can also find them on our website, www.ciena.com/podcast. 643 00:31:50,819 --> 00:31:51,995 Thank you, everyone. 644 00:31:51,995 --> 00:31:52,995 I hope 645 00:31:52,995 --> 00:31:54,466 everyone has a great day.